-
The Ghost in the Machine: Richard Swinburne and the Case for the Soul
Over the last few weeks, we have navigated the busy streets of physicalism. We saw Daniel Dennett argue that the mind is a clever trick of the brain—a “user-illusion.” We saw Galen Strawson argue for a “Real Physicalism,” suggesting that matter itself is inherently conscious. Despite their differences, they both shared a common boundary: they…
-
The Real Physicalist: Why Galen Strawson Thinks Matter is Conscious
Over the last few weeks, we have navigated two very different maps of the mind: Daniel Dennett’s world, where consciousness is an evolutionary user-illusion, and David Chalmers’ Hard Problem, which suggests a universe split between physical facts and mental properties. However, as we move deeper into the mystery, we encounter a thinker who suggests that…
-
The Man Who Made Philosophy Hard Again: David Chalmers and the “Hard Problem”
The Morning After Dennett In my last post, we explored Daniel Dennett’s world—a world where we are complex biological robots. In Dennett’s view, consciousness is essentially a biological computer running a sophisticated program. When you smell coffee or feel a breeze, your brain is simply executing “sub-routines” of data collection, self-monitoring, and linguistic reporting. To…