We have been exploring Process Philosophy and its theological application, Process Theology (PT). In PT, there is a God who is responsible for the existence of everything, but in a way that is fundamentally different from what many traditional Christians believe. The Process God acts through persuasion, not coercion, serving as a co-creator whose influence works within the intrinsic freedom of the universe itself. This view means God didn’t force the world to be the way it is.
We confront the work of philosopher Daniel Dennett. If Dennett is right, there is no God, and the universe consists only of physical substances and physical properties. This leads to a profound question: If we are merely physical machines, how is it that humans are conscious, subjective beings? Dennett’s theory is designed to answer this by showing that consciousness is not a deep mystery requiring a soul or special mental properties, but an evolutionary trick. Dennett often calls himself an Illusionist, a term that is frequently misinterpreted. He is not arguing that consciousness is unreal or that subjective experiences don’t exist; rather, he is demonstrating that the widely held belief that these experiences must be philosophically irreducible to physical mechanisms is the profound illusion.
The Cartesian Intuition: The Historical Problem
Dennett recognizes that his work must begin by confronting the powerful, intuitive beliefs nearly all people share about consciousness. This feeling—that we are a separate, immaterial core observing the world from inside our head—is the Cartesian intuition.
This intuition is rooted in Substance Dualism, the historical idea that the mind (the immaterial, non-physical soul) and the body (physical matter) are two fundamentally different substances. While this view has largely been dismissed by neuroscience, the powerful feeling of a centralized observer persists. Dennett’s task is to dismantle this illusion and show that the feeling itself is merely a convincing trick.
However, Dennett’s primary debate is not with this older, historical error. His major project is dedicated to confronting the modern, sophisticated defense of mind/body separation championed by contemporary philosophers.
Part I: The Materialist Mandate and the Attack on Property Dualism
Dennett is an unapologetic materialist. For him, all phenomena, including the mind, must be explained using the physical laws of nature, neuroscience, and—crucially—Darwinian evolution.
A key strength of Dennett’s functional approach is its independence from specific biology. For Dennett, consciousness is a form of highly sophisticated information processing—an evolved algorithm—which means it is not substrate-dependent. The human brain, being carbon-based, is simply the first system we know of to run this “software.” Dennett would readily agree that consciousness could evolve on a world with completely different biology (silicon, plasma, etc.), provided the substrate allows for the requisite complexity, storage, and parallel processing.
This commitment requires Dennett to confront Property Dualism, a widely defended contemporary position. Property Dualists, such as David Chalmers, concede that the brain is entirely physical (rejecting Substance Dualism), but they maintain that the brain generates unique, non-physical properties known as qualia (the subjective, raw feeling of “redness” or “pain”). They argue that no physical description can logically account for the existence of subjective experience, pointing to the Explanatory Gap.
Dennett’s counter-argument is that the belief in irreducible qualia is a profound mistake. He views the claim that these subjective qualities cannot be logically reduced to objective physical properties as an intellectual surrender—a willingness to accept a permanent, irreducible mystery. He believes that to claim qualia are irreducible is simply to say, “We don’t know how that happens, and it’s fundamentally unexplainable by the methods of science.” The specific illusion he targets is the belief that our first-person experiences are fundamentally irreducible to physical, functional processes.
Clarifying “Batness”: Dennett agrees with Thomas Nagel that there is “something it is like to be a bat,” but he denies that this “batness” is a magical, inaccessible truth. The bat’s consciousness is a different physical phenomenon—a chaotic, constantly updated stream of sensory data. The illusion he is dispelling is the powerful, but mistaken, interpretation that this feeling requires a special, non-physical property.
Part II: The Mechanics: Drafts, Minions, and Competence
If there is no central stage where decisions are made, how does the brain work? Dennett’s theory relies on two core mechanical concepts:
1. The Multiple Drafts Model
Dennett suggests the brain is not a theater but the chaotic, parallel editorial room of a giant news agency.
Every sensation, memory, and decision is written down simultaneously by different processes (different brain regions). These reports are constantly being edited, revised, and rewritten—these are the “multiple drafts.” There is no single finish line where a report is stamped “FINAL” and declared conscious. Consciousness is simply the result of these competing narratives being utilized by other systems in the brain.
2. Competence without Comprehension
Dennett answers the question of how complex tasks are performed by non-conscious parts of the brain with the principle of competence without comprehension.
The brain is full of billions of “minions”—simple, mindless processes—that are incredibly good at specific jobs, but never need to comprehend the big picture. This principle allows Dennett to explain how the high-level illusion of consciousness can be built using only ground-level, algorithmic “cranes,” rather than resorting to magical “skyhooks” (non-physical properties) to bridge the gap between matter and mind.
Part III: The Functional Self and Free Will
If the brain is just a chaotic committee of drafts and minions, why does it feel so powerfully unified, and who is responsible for its actions?
Dennett argues that the solution is functional: we must adopt the Intentional Stance toward ourselves—treating a complex system as if it had beliefs and intentions, even if we know those terms are shorthand for physical processes.
This leads directly to the core concept of the self: the Center of Narrative Gravity. The self is an abstract fictional point around which all the stories, memories, decisions, and actions of the brain cohere.
The Dennettian View of Freedom
Dennett is a compatibilist, arguing that free will and determinism are, in fact, compatible. He redefines free will functionally and ethically:
We are “free” not because we violate causality, but because we are highly evolved systems that possess the capacity for reflection and adaptation. Freedom, for Dennett, is not a supernatural property; it is a skill and a social status conferred upon the most sophisticated, reflective mechanisms.
Part IV: The Memetic Self and the Cultural Leap
To create the unified Center of Narrative Gravity (the “I”), the brain needs the tools of culture, primarily memes. Dennett adopts the term meme (a unit of cultural transmission) to explain how human consciousness evolved beyond mere biological capacity.
The unique aspect of human consciousness—the ability to think about thinking—is largely a result of the brain being infected by linguistic memes. The brain provides the hardware, but language provides the powerful software that can run a linear, internal narration on the brain’s naturally parallel architecture.
- The Self is the protagonist of this internal narrative. This story is built out of social and moral concepts (memes).
- The continued use of the pronoun “I” in conversation and thought reinforces and stabilizes the chaotic “multiple drafts,” creating the coherent illusion of the Cartesian Self.
This sophisticated narrative capacity provides the basis for moral responsibility. We don’t hold the soul responsible; we hold the narrative-creating system responsible. By holding individuals accountable, society is providing a high-level feedback mechanism to modify the programming of that self-editing, narrative system.
Conclusion
Dennett asks us to abandon our intuitive idea of the soul and embrace a profound biological humility. We are not spirits piloting biological machines; we are the biological machine’s self-description—the most convincing magic trick in the universe.
The self is real, but only as a narrative structure and a social agent. By understanding this illusion, Dennett provides a way forward, ensuring that our concept of consciousness and freedom remains firmly rooted in the physical, evolutionary world, free from the necessity of special non-physical properties.
If we think of the brain as sophisticated computer hardware running the software of consciousness, the illusion becomes clear. The software creates a beautiful, unified user interface (the Ego) that hides the chaotic complexity of the billions of lines of code (the Multiple Drafts and Minions) running underneath. Our feeling that our experience is irreducible is simply the phenomenal experience of that elegant user interface, leading us to mistake a functional achievement for a magical, non-physical truth.
📚 Recommended Reading on Consciousness and the Mind
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If you are intrigued by Dennett’s materialist explanation of consciousness and wish to explore the major arguments for and against his position, the following texts are highly recommended for delving deeper into this philosophical and neuroscientific system:
- Dennett, Daniel C. Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds Dennett’s definitive and most recent book, presenting his complete theory of how the evolutionary process, driven by natural selection and cultural memes, constructs the human mind without relying on any magical or spiritual component.
- Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory The essential counter-argument to Dennett. Chalmers argues that subjective experience (qualia) is a non-physical, irreducible property that constitutes “The Hard Problem,” which materialism cannot solve.
- Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness Explained Dennett’s classic 1991 work, where he first introduced the revolutionary Multiple Drafts Model and first systematically attempted to dismantle the popular concept of the Cartesian Theater (the central viewing screen in the brain).
- Searle, John R. The Mystery of Consciousness A brief but powerful critique from a rival materialist. Searle argues that while consciousness is entirely biological (a physical feature of the brain), Dennett’s “Illusionism” mistakenly explains away the real, intrinsic quality of subjective experience.
- Seth, Anil. Being You: A New Science of Consciousness A contemporary neuroscientist’s approach to the topic, supporting the functionalist view. Seth argues that consciousness is best understood as a “controlled hallucination”—the brain’s predictive, best-guess model of the world and the self.